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The Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong (CFA), the highestcourt established in Hong Kong after the 1997 handover, has
made two landmark but controversial decisions on freedom of
expression. The decision in Cheng Albert and Another v Tse Wai
Chun Paul (Cheng v Tse) has made it much more difficult for a
plaintiff to succeed in a defamation action. It has the effect of
promoting freedom of expression. The other decision, in HKSAR
v Ng Kung Siu and Another (HKSAR v Ng), endorsed the
criminalisation of flag desecration introduced at the time of the
handover. This effectively restricts the scope for freedom of
expression.  These two divergent rulings vividly demonstrate that
the newly founded highest court, through its interpretation of the
common law and constitutional scrutiny of statutes, has exerted
substantial influence on the extent and substance of freedom of
expression in post-1997 Hong Kong. Indeed, the youthful CFA
has proved crucial in the protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms of Hong Kong people, but at the same time its decisions
have resulted in considerable controversy.
One Court, Two Rulings?
Freedom Of Expression
In Post-1997 Hong Kong
Yan Mei Ning
Hong Kong Baptist University
This paper examines the two most controversial decisions on freedom of
expression made by the Court of Final Appeal, the highest court in Hong
Kong in the post-handover period. The first was a defamation case - Cheng
Albert and Another v Tse Wai Chun Paul. The second - HKSAR v Ng
Kung Siu and Another - was the criminal sanction of flag desecration.
The outcomes of these two landmark cases were completely different.
One has promoted freedom of expression, while the other has restricted
it. Both cases have considerable potential to impact on how much and
what kind of freedom of expression Hong Kong people may enjoy  post-
1997 under the promise of ‘one country, two systems’. The decisions
also shed light on a very important question – how well can the Court of
Final Appeal protect and promote freedom of expression in Hong Kong?
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On 1 July 1997, Hong Kong was made a ‘Special
Administrative Region’ (HKSAR) of the People’s Republic of China
(PRC or China). Socialist China pledged to allow Hong Kong a
high degree of autonomy and to keep the territory’s capitalistic
system unchanged for a period of 50 years. These promises,
embedded in the policy of ‘Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong’
and the principle of ‘one country, two systems’, have been
guaranteed by the HKSAR’s mini-constitution – the Basic Law.
Article 27 of the Basic Law provides that Hong Kong residents
shall have freedom of speech, of the press and of publication.
Moreover, Article 39 stipulates that the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as applied to Hong Kong
shall remain in force and shall be implemented through the laws
of HKSAR. Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees freedom of
expression. Such freedom of expression is not absolute, but any
restrictions have to satisfy conditions laid down in Article 19(3).
First, they have to be prescribed by law. Second, they should fall
within one of the following grounds: respect of the rights or
reputations of others; the protection of national security or of public
order ; or protection of public health or morals. Third, the restrictive
measures must be necessary and proportionate to the aims sought
to be achieved.
The Basic Law also stipulates in Article 19 that Hong Kong
shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that
of final adjudication. The CFA serving as the HKSAR’s highest
court puts  an end to the colonial practice of going to the Privy
Council in England for final appeals. Article 82 of the Basic Law
provides that judges from other common law jurisdictions may
as required be invited to sit on the CFA. This has been implemented
by the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance. Five judges are required
for each panel hearing an appeal, consisting of the Chief Justice,
three other permanent Hong Kong judges and a non-permanent
Hong Kong judge or a judge from another common law
jurisdiction selected by the Chief Justice and invited by the Court.
Cheng v Tse was a defamation case. Albert Cheng and Lam
Yuk Wah were co-hosts of a Commercial Radio phone-in
programme. The two co-hosts and their radio station were sued
by a solicitor, Paul Tse, for remarks made during their programme
on 1 August 1996. The remarks were about the aftermath of a rescue
campaign of two Hong Kong residents jailed by the Philippines
government  for alleged drug trafficking. Cheng and Tse had been
at loggerheads over the different positions they had taken in their
respective attempts to assist the rescue campaign. All three
The Post
1997
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Cheng
vs Tse
6 AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No. 11, July - December 2001
YAN MEI-NING:  One Court, two rulings ...
defendants pleaded fair comment on a matter of public interest as
a defence. In reply, Tse pleaded that the defendants had made the
statements maliciously, which would negate the defence.
At the trial, the jury held in favour of the radio station but
against Cheng and Lam. The two appealed on the ground that the
judge had misdirected the jury on the issues relating to malice. In
particular, their counsel argued that the judge was wrong to apply
to the defence of fair comment the test on the issue of malice
applicable to the defence of qualified privilege.
The Court of Appeal (CA) dismissed the appeal, ruling that
the test for malice was the same for both qualified privilege and
fair comment. In doing so, the CA relied on views in a leading
textbook on defamation (Gatley on Libel and Slander 1998: par 16.2).
The CA held that proof of malice would defeat both defences of
qualified privilege and fair comment because if a person acted
with malice – i.e. making use of a privileged occasion or purporting
to exercise his freedom of speech in expressing an opinion for his
own purposes or to further his own motive – he/she would be
regarded in law as abusing his freedom of speech. The CA decision
noted that there was ample evidence from which the jury could
draw the conclusion that Tse had succeeded in proving malice on
the part of Cheng and Lam.
Cheng and Lam further appealed to the CFA, renewing their
challenge to the correctness and adequacy of the judge’s summing
up on the issue of malice. Only Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, sitting
on the CFA as a judge from other common law jurisdictions, gave
a reasoned judgment on the defence of fair comment and the
related issue of malice. All the other four judges concurred.
Lord Nicholls noted that the title of the defence of “fair
comment” was misleading. He considered “comment”, or “honest
comment”, would be a more satisfactory name. Lord Nicholls then
identified well-established, non-controversial ingredients of the
defence. First, the comment must be on a matter of public interest.
Second, the comment must be recognisable as comment, not an
imputation of fact. Third, the comment must be based on facts
that are true or protected by privilege. Fourth, the comment must
indicate, explicitly or implicitly, what are the facts on which the
comment is being made. Fifth, the comment must be one which
could have been made by an honest person, however prejudiced
he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views.
These are the outer, objective limits of the defence of fair comment.
To rely on the defence, defendants have to prove that their
comment falls within these limits.
Defence
Of Fair
Comment
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The plaintiff may still defeat the defence of fair comment by
proving that the defendant was “actuated by malice” when he/
she made a statement. The question raised by this appeal
concerned the meaning of malice in the context of the defence of
fair comment. More specifically, whether the purpose or motive –
spite and ill will in particular – for which a defendant stated an
honestly held opinion might deprive him of the protection of the
defence of fair comment.
The CFA’s ruling took the Hong Kong legal profession by
surprise. It held that a comment that falls within the objective limits
of the defence of fair comment can lose its immunity only by proof
that the defendant did not genuinely hold the view he expressed.
Lord Nicholls further expounded:
“Honesty of belief is the touchstone. Actuation by spite,
animosity, intent to injure, intent to arouse controversy or other
motivation, whatever it may be, even if it is the dominant or sole
motive, does not of itself defeat the defence. However, proof of
such motivation may be evidence, sometimes compelling evidence,
from which lack of genuine belief in the view expressed may be
inferred.”
The CFA quashed the jury’s verdicts regarding Cheng and
Lam and ordered a new trial. In his judgment, Lord Nicholls
attached much importance to the purpose of the defence of fair
comment, which is to facilitate freedom of expression by
commenting on matters of public interest. The defence of fair
comment envisages, according to Lord Nicholl, that everyone is
at liberty to conduct social and political campaigns by expressing
his own views. Commentators of all shades of opinions may
therefore have ulterior motives and are entitled to “have their own
agenda”. The defence should therefore not be restricted to
comments made for particular reasons or particular purposes,
some being regarded as proper, others not. He stressed:
“Nor is it for the courts to choose between ‘public’ and
‘private’ purposes, or between purposes they regard as morally
or socially or politically desirable and those they regard as
undesirable. That would be a highly dangerous course. That way
lies censorship. That would defeat the purpose for which the law
accords the defence of freedom to make comments on matter of
public interest. The objective safeguards, coupled with the need
to have a genuine belief in what is said, are adequate to keep the
ambit of permissible comment within reasonable bounds.”
Nicholls explained he did not think the law should attempt
to ring-fence comments made with the sole or dominant motive
of causing injury out of spite. “The spiteful publication of a
defamatory statement of fact attracts no remedy if the statement
is proved to be true. Why should the position be different for the
The Issue
Of Malice
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spiteful publication of a defamatory, genuinely held comment
based on true fact?”
In Lord Nicholls’ opinion, books such as Gatley on Libel and
Slander (1998: par 16.2), Carter-Ruck on Libel and Slander (1997: 116),
Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (1998: 427) and Halsbury’s Laws of
England (1973: par 149) had erred in their interpretation of the
issue of malice. Since there has been no direct authority over the
last 150 years, he noted, most textbooks tended to rely on the
speech of Lord Diplock in Horrocks v Lowe – a leading authority
on the issue of malice in relation to the defence of qualified
privilege – in their analyses of the issue of malice in relation to
the defence of fair comment. These textbooks came to the
conclusion that the defence of an honest defendant might be
vitiated by the motive with which the words were published.
Although the defence of fair comment had grown from the
defence of qualified privilege in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, Lord Nicholls regarded the approach of these textbooks
as problematic. He pointed to the fact that the purposes for which
the law had accorded the defence of qualified privilege and the
defence of fair comment were not the same. The defence of
qualified privilege is there to protect persons having a duty to
perform or an interest to protect in providing the information from
defamation actions. If a person’s dominant motive is not to
perform his duty or protect this interest, he is outside the ambit
of the defence. The rationale of the defence of fair comment is
different. The basis of the defence is the high importance of
protecting and promoting the freedom of comment by everyone
at all times on matters of public interest, irrespective of their
particular motives. Lord Nicholls maintained the textbooks had
erred because of their failure to appreciate the differences.
In essence, the issue of malice in relation to the defence of
fair comment deals only with the dishonesty of the defendant –
i.e. whether the defendant did not genuinely hold the view he
expressed or was recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of
his comments – and not with the motive or purpose for which he
expressed his views. To avoid confusion, Lord Nicholls advised
judges in the future to shun the word “malice” altogether:  “Juries
can be instructed, regarding fair comment, that the defence is
defeated by proof that the defendant did not genuinely believe
the opinion he expressed.”
The CFA ruling in Cheng v Tse has been a landmark decision
for Hong Kong’s defamation law.  By holding that the defence of
fair comment cannot be defeated by the defendant’s motive or
purpose behind the defamatory statement and by holding the
defence can only be defeated by proof that the defendant did not
genuinely believe the opinion he expressed, the CFA decision in
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Cheng v Tse has the effect of promoting freedom of expression,
and political speeches in particular. Opinion makers, especially
those active in politics, can feel freer in expressing their views
and opinions. They are effectively less restricted than before, when
motives were supposedly crucial in the defence of fair comment.
More importantly, the CFA decision in Cheng v Tse has
alleviated, to some extent, the inhibiting effect of Hong Kong’s
defamation law. This is of high importance when judged against
two trends – lack of statutory reform of defamation law, and an
increase in the number of defamation actions.
Traditionally, Hong Kong’s defamation law has been based
primarily on English law. Defamation law protects the reputations
of individuals and corporations. The law is overwhelmingly
favourable to claimants. Both in England and in Hong Kong,
defamation law has been widely criticised for its chilling effect on
media freedom (see Robertson 1992; Barendt et al. 1997; Cottrell
1999). To begin with, for a plaintiff to initiate defamation action,
all he or she needs is to prove the statement is defamatory,
published to a third party and referring to the plaintiff.  There is
no need for the plaintiff to prove intention to defame or that he
has suffered any actual damage. Moreover, the defamatory
statement is presumed to be false. The defendant is liable for
defamation if he cannot prove otherwise. Second, the net has been
cast very wide. Anyone involved in the publication of the statement
may be liable. Third, defamation litigation is a complex and lengthy
process. The main defences available are few and difficult to rely
upon.
In England, efforts have been made in recent years to simplify
defamation litigation. New measures in the Defamation Act 1996
included the introduction of a summary procedure for disposal
of claims, reduction of the limitation period for bringing a libel
action from three years to one year, with judicial discretion to
extend it, the revision of the offer to amend defence to encourage
the defendant to offer correction and apology, and the expansion
of the range of people not liable for defamation. However, there
has been no similar development in Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s
current Defamation Ordinance is still largely based on the UK’s
Defamation Act 1952. The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong,
since its formation in 1980, has never looked specifically at
defamation law.
Meanwhile, there has been a surge of defamation cases in
Hong Kong in the last decade. Two major factors have contributed
to the phenomenon. First is the rise of talk shows, tabloid
newspapers and magazines, many of which have a practice of
carrying revealing, embarrassing or controversial stories. Second,
media organizations themselves had initiated a number of
Impact On
Freedom Of
Expression
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defamation cases against other media organizations.
Against such a background, judicially engineered reform is
of particular importance in reducing the chilling effect of
defamation law. Nonetheless, before the 1997 handover, no
defamation actions from Hong Kong had ever reached the Privy
Council in London. In fact, not many defamation actions reached
the CA level in Hong Kong. Things appear to be different since
the CFA came into being. In the three defamation cases that have
reached the CFA so far, the Court sided with defendants and
overturned decisions of the CA. The CFA repeatedly emphasized
the importance of a generous approach in dealing with defamation
cases. In Eastern Express Publisher Ltd v Mo Man Ching and
Another, the Court held that when the defence of fair comment is
relied upon, a degree of rhetoric could be allowed in the allegedly
defamatory statement. The CA should not take the words in the
statement too literally and come to the conclusion that there was
no substructure of fact to justify the opinion. Giving the judgment,
Sir Anthony Mason remarked that “in a society in which there is
a constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression, no narrow
approach should be taken to the scope of fair comment on a matter
of public interest as a defence to an action of defamation”.
Chief Justice Li in Cheng v Tse reiterated these remarks: The
CFA’s ruling in Cheng v Tse represented a big step forward in the
judicial development of defamation law. Yet, it is too early to assess
the effect, if any, of the CFA decision in Cheng v Tse and the
generous approach adopted in defamation cases. It will be
interesting to see if this has a significant impact on the number of
defamation actions brought.
Not all reaction to the CFA ruling in Cheng v Tse was
favourable. The pro-Beijing camp harshly criticised the decision
on several grounds (Ma 2000: A11). First, it was said that the ruling
would encourage commentators and politicians to attack their
enemies in an irresponsible manner, abusing freedom of
expression. Second, it was said the ruling was made by a
“parachute judge”, i.e. Lord Nicholls, who did not know Hong
Kong and made decisions unbeneficial to Hong Kong society. The
critics went so far as to argue that “this misconception that all
House of Lords judges make good Hong Kong judges needs to be
banished” (Ma 2000: A11).  Third, the CFA was accused of engaging
in “judicial activism” through some of its rulings, including that
of Cheng v Tse (Siu 2000: 16).
The criticisms of a “parachute judge” went too far. Even the
Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung, who is known for her close
connections to the pro-Beijing camp, had to openly refute the
argument, stressing that the judgment was a unanimous one and
that Hong Kong benefited much from having judges from other
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common law jurisdictions sitting on the CFA (Hong Kong iMail
2000: A07).
Yet the “parachute judge” argument did point to an issue of
importance: would any Hong Kong permanent judges dare to
make the same ruling in Cheng v Tse, which provided an answer
to a legal issue not tackled for the past 150 years and maintained
the leading textbooks had erred? Indeed, the CFA judgment in
Cheng v Tse had to be made by a judge of very high seniority and
standing like Lord Nicholls, who had earlier delivered in the House
of Lords an important judgment on the defence of qualified
privilege in Reynolds v Times Newspaper Ltd. In the colonial era,
Hong Kong judges mainly applied precedents or followed leading
textbooks if no appropriate case law was available. It may take
some time for permanent judges of the CFA to build up their own
authority before they can come up with rulings similar to that
made by Lord Nicholls in Cheng v Tse, which had the effect of
promoting freedom of expression in Hong Kong.  Yet discussions
in the latter part of this paper will show that in the foreseeable
future there seems little prospect for ‘judicial activism’, a concept
much attacked by the pro-Beijing camp.
HKSAR v Ng was Hong Kong’s first flag desecration case.
Criminal sanctions for flag desecration only came into being in
Hong Kong upon the return of sovereignty to China. No similar
laws had existed before.
In 1990, China promulgated the Law on the National Flag.
Article 1 stipulates the objectives of “defending the dignity of the
National Flag, enhancing citizens’ consciousness of the State and
promoting the spirit of patriotism”. Article 19 provides criminal
sanction for desecration of the national flag.
The application of China’s national laws in the HKSAR is
governed by Article 18(2) of the Basic Law. National laws
applicable are confined to those listed in Annex III of the Basic
Law and shall be applied locally by way of promulgation or
legislation by the HKSAR. On 1 July 1997, the Law on the National
Flag was added to the list of laws in Annex III. Accordingly, the
legislature in Hong Kong enacted the National Flag and National
Emblem Ordinance (the National Flag Ordinance). Section 7 of
the Ordinance criminalised desecration of the national flag.
Meanwhile, Regional Flag and Regional Emblem Ordinance (The
Regional Flag Ordinance) was also enacted, governing the use and
protection of the HKSAR flag. Section 7 of the ordinance provides
criminal sanction for desecrating the regional flag.
HKSAR
vs Ng
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Facts of the Case
Two young men, Ng Kung Siu and Lee Kin Yun, were seen
carrying the national and regional flags, damaged and defaced,
during a protest on New Year’s Day, 1998. They were subsequently
charged according to Section 7 of the National Flag Ordinance
and Section 7 of the Regional Flag Ordinance. The defence
submitted both before the magistrate and the CA that these two
provisions were inconsistent with Article 19 of the ICCPR, and
therefore contravened Article 39 of the Basic Law.
Decisions of the Lower Courts
At the trial, the magistrate held that the two provisions had
restricted the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article
19 of the ICCPR, but were justified under Article 19(3) – being
necessary for the protection of public order. The magistrate
maintained that any responsible government should not overlook
the real possibility of social disorder caused by the desecration of
the national flag in public.
The magistrate resorted to the principle of  ‘one country, two
systems’, and found that the regional flag should enjoy no less
protection than that of the national flag. As a result, the two
defendants were convicted of both offences and ordered to be
bound over to keep the peace for a period of 12 months.
On appeal, the CA quashed the convictions of Ng and Lee.
The CA held that the two provisions were inconsistent with Article
19 of the ICCPR and, as such, contravened Article 39 of the Basic
Law. The CA said there was no evidence and no basis for the
magistrate to rule that the two provisions were justified as being
necessary for the protection of public order under Article 19(3).
The CA maintained that the magistrate had failed to give due
weight to the fact that the law, e.g. the Public Order Ordinance
already catered for a variety of situations arising out of abuse of
the flag which might lead to charges ranging from riot and
unlawful assembly to breach of the peace.
 In examining whether the two provisions were necessary, the
CA also paid regard to the unlikelihood of serious civil disturbance
arising from flag desecration and further said that the enactment
of the two provisions was not necessary for the normal operation
of the HKSAR.
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The CFA Ruling
The prosecution appealed to the CFA. The appeals were
allowed and the convictions and orders for binding over by the
magistrate were restored. The question before the CFA was
whether criminalisation of flag desecration, which had restricted
freedom of expression, was permissible under Article 19(3) of the
ICCPR and therefore did not contravene the Basic Law.
Chief Justice Li maintained that the national flag and regional
flag were of intrinsic importance. He cited the raising of the flags
at the beginning of the handover ceremony and the speech of the
President of the PRC on that occasion.  The Chief Justice said:
“The society in the People’s Republic of China, the country
as a whole, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, has a legitimate interest in protecting their national flag,
the unique symbol of the Nation. Similarly, the community in the
Hong Kong  Special Administrative Region has a legitimate interest
in protecting the regional flag, the unique symbol of the Region as
an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China under the
principle of ‘one country, two systems’.”
The question before the Court, said the Chief Justice, was
whether these legitimate interests justified the restriction on
freedom of expression by the criminalisation of desecration of
national and regional flags. In answering the question, he first
held that the restriction on freedom of expression, i.e.
criminalisation of flag desecration, fell within the permissible
objective of protecting public order. Yet he ruled that both the
magistrate and the CA had been incorrect in limiting the concept
of public order to the common law notion of law and order.
The Chief Justice stressed that public order mentioned in the
ICCPR was a much wider concept, including what was necessary
for the protection of the general welfare or for the interests of the
collectivity as a whole. This might vary over time, place and
circumstances. With regard to Hong Kong’s new constitutional
order, he held that the protection of the national flag and regional
flag had formed part of the general welfare and the interests of
the collectivity as a whole and therefore had fallen within the
concept of public order.
In considering whether the restriction was necessary, he said
the CFA should also give due weight to the view of the HKSAR’s
legislature that the enactment of the National Flag Ordinance and
the criminalisation of desecration of national flag was appropriate
for the discharge of the Region’s obligation stipulated by Article
18(2) of the Basic Law. “Similarly, the Court should accord due
weight to the view of the HKSAR’s legislature that it is appropriate
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to enact the Regional Flag Ordinance.”
The CFA judges also believed that criminalisation of flag
desecration was regarded as necessary for the protection of public
order in other democratic societies, because a number of ICCPR
signatories had enacted such legislation.
The CFA concluded that the restriction was justifiable, because
it had only limited effect on freedom of expression and was
proportionate to the objective sought:
“Hong Kong is at the early stage of the new order following
resumption of the exercise of sovereignty by the People’s Republic
of China. The implementation of the principle of ‘one country,
two systems’ is a matter of fundamental importance, as is the
reinforcement of national unity and territorial integrity. Protection
of the national flag and the regional flag from desecration, having
regard to their unique symbolism, will play an important part in
the attainment of these goals. In these circumstances, there are
strong grounds for concluding that the criminalisation of flag
desecration is a justifiable restriction on the guaranteed right to
the freedom of expression.”
   In his judgment, the Chief Justice maintained that the
prohibition of flag desecration was a limited restriction on the
freedom of expression. He argued that it banned only one mode
of expression, i.e. flag desecration, and did not interfere with the
person’s freedom to express the same message by other modes.
Justice Bokhary was the only other CFA judge who gave a
reasoned judgment. He said that it was possible for a society to
protect its flags and emblems while at the same time maintaining
its freedom of expression so long as the legislation was specific
enough to ban the mode of expression only to the extent of keeping
flags and emblems impartially beyond politics and strife and did
not affect the substance of expression. He maintained that “the
only restriction placed is against the desecration of objects which
hardly anyone would dream of desecrating even if there was no
law against it. No idea would be suppressed by the restriction.
Neither political outspokenness or any other form of
outspokenness would be inhibited”.
Towards the end of his judgment, Justice Bokhary attempted
to reassure the general public by answering a question posed by a
defence counsel, who had asked: “If these restrictions are
permissible, where does it stop?”
 Justice Bokhary said: “It is a perfectly legitimate question.
And the answer, as I see it, is that it stops where these restrictions
are located. For they lie just within the outer limits of
constitutionality. Beneath the national and regional flags and
Impact On
Freedom Of
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emblems, all persons in Hong Kong are – and can be confident
that they will remain – equally free under our law to express their
views on all matters whether political or non-political: saying what
they like, how they like.”
In his judgment, the Chief Justice has also highlighted the
importance of freedom of expression in the HKSAR: “Freedom of
expression is a fundamental freedom in a democratic society. It
lies at the heart of civil society and of Hong Kong’s system and
way of life. The courts must give a generous interpretation to its
constitutional guarantee. This freedom includes the freedom to
express ideas which the majority may find disagreeable or
offensive and the freedom to criticise governmental institutions
and the conduct of public officials.”
In essence, both judges tried to assure the general public that
the inhibiting effect on freedom of expression arising from
criminalisation of flag desecration was limited and that the Court
attached great importance to freedom of expression. Yet an
examination of similar decisions elsewhere and other related issues
on the home front would reveal otherwise.
The arguments of the CFA on the necessity of criminalisation
of flag desecrations resembled the minority views of the Supreme
Court of the United States.  The US is the only common law country
where a fierce debate on the issue of flag desecration has gone on
for many years. The Supreme Court had to decide whether laws
punishing flag burning violated the US Constitution in the two
consecutive years of 1989 and 1990, first in Texas v Johnson on a
state law and then in US v Eichman on a federal law. On both
occasions, the Court was bitterly divided. A narrow majority of
five to four ruled that the prohibition of flag burning was
inconsistent with the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment to the American Constitution.
In Texas v Johnson, Chief Justice Rehnquist along with the
two other dissenting judges maintained that the American flag
occupied a unique position as the symbol of their nation, and every
true American had a deep affection for it. He further noted that
the right of free speech was not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances. As with “fighting words”, flag burning was no
essential part of any exposition of ideas for the purposes of the
First Amendment. It was of such slight social value that any benefit
that might be derived from it was clearly outweighed by the public
interest in avoiding a probable breach of the peace.
 Furthermore, the resulting restriction on freedom of speech
was a very limited one. The law punished the protester, Johnson,
for burning the flag in public, not for the idea that he sought to
convey. He was free to make any verbal denunciation of the flag
or to burn the flag in private. Chief Justice Rehnquist held that
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uncritical extension by the Court of constitutional protection to
the public burning of flags risked the frustration of the very
purpose for which organised governments were instituted.
On the other hand, Justice Brennan, in delivering the opinions
of the majority, pointed out that while the government had an
interest in encouraging proper treatment of the flag, this did not
mean that it might criminally punish a person for burning it as a
means of political protest. He refuted the argument that only a
mode of expression, burning of the flag, had been banned. The
restriction on Johnson’s expression was content-based. He was
prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with the policies
of his country, expression situated at the core of the First
Amendment values.
 Justice Brennan stressed: “If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may
not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. We have not recognized
an exception to this principle even where our flag has been
involved.” He explained that it was not the State’s ends, but its
means, to which the Court objected. Justice Brennan asserted that
national unity, as an end that officials might foster by persuasion
and example, was not in question. “We do not consecrate the flag
by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute the freedom
that this cherished emblem represents.”
It is submitted that the majority opinion in Texas v Johnson
has offered a much more thoughtful and insightful interpretation
of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and its
relation to a democracy. Yet nowhere in the CFA judgment of
HKSAR v Ng can these views be found. More worrying is a
conservative political overtone attached to the ruling.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist in Texas v Johnson in his
argument for the unique importance of the American flag had been
charged with the high emotion of an ordinary citizen. Quite
differently, Chief Justice Li in HKSAR v Ng argued for the
uniqueness of the national and regional flags in a cold and
detached manner, and more from the perspective of the State. It
seems that the emphasis was more on the superior status of state
organs and high-ranking officials, and the submissive and obedient
role of ordinary citizens. In essence, the judgment sounds more
familiar as a policy speech delivered by a PRC official than as a
judgment of a court of justice in Hong Kong.
Second, it is debatable for Justice Bokhary to maintain that
flags and emblems had to be kept impartially beyond politics and
strife, and that hardly anyone would dream of flag desecration
even if there was no law against it. In Texas v Johnson, Justice
Brennan clearly pointed out that the burning of flag in public was
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protected by the First Amendment because it was a form of
political protest expressing dissatisfaction with government
policies. Indeed, during the hearing of U.S. v Eichman, Justice
Kennedy pointed out flag desecration had become an
internationally recognized form of political protest (Overbeck
2001:71). Furthermore, the national flag and the national emblem
of the PRC have never been apolitical and above party interest.
The big star at the centre of the national flag represents the
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (He 1995:8;
Yao 1999). The kind of unity expressed by the national flag and
emblem is unity under the CCP. This was exactly why the two
protesters, Ng and Lee, had desecrated the flags – to express their
disagreement with the authoritarian rule of the CCP in China and
the lack of democracy in Hong Kong.
Third, the assurance of Justice Bokhary of no further
restrictions on freedom of expression seems a personal one. The
rest of the CFA judges sitting, including the Chief Justice, were
silent on this point and did not endorse his views.
Indeed, the CFA judgment in HKSAR v Ng has made Hong
Kong people come to terms with a reality of the post-1997 style of
freedom of expression – flag desecration has become a taboo
attracting criminal sanction.
It should, however, be acknowledged that the CFA was in a
very difficult position when considering the final appeal of
HKSAR v Ng in October 1999.  As noted earlier, Article 18(2)
requires Hong Kong to implement national laws listed in Annex
III of the Basic Law. The Law on the National Flag was one of
these laws. The CFA would have created a constitutional
controversy if it had chosen to declare that the criminalisation of
national flag desecration, based on Article 18(2), was in conflict
with Article 39 of the Basic Law, which provides for the continued
application of the ICCPR in Hong Kong.
Indeed, during the hearing of the final appeal of HKSAR v
Ng, the prosecution made it plain that the Secretary for Justice
would go to Beijing to ask the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress (NPC) for an interpretation of the Basic Law, if
the CFA was to rule on any dispute relating to the application of
national laws in Hong Kong, an issue which the Court eventually
did not take up (Wong 1999: A25). Just four months earlier, in
June 1999, the Standing Committee of the NPC interpreted for
the first time the Basic Law at the request of the Hong Kong
government, which had the effect of overruling the CFA’s decision
in Ng Ka Ling and Others v Director of Immigration. The incident
led to big controversies and created serious doubts on very
important constitutional issues such as the judicial independence
of Hong Kong and where the power of final adjudication was
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vested – in the CFA or in Beijing. Any further interpretation of the
Basic Law by Beijing in so short a time period would have totally
undermined the authority of the CFA.
The above discussions have illustrated that the CFA as the
newly established highest court in Hong Kong has proven crucial
in deciding the extent and the kind of freedom of expression that
Hong Kong people may enjoy post-1997. There are still too few
cases available to predict with confidence whether freedom of
expression will be promoted or restricted in the long run. Yet the
picture may not be that encouraging despite freedom of expression
being promoted in the CFA ruling of Cheng v Tse. The impact of
the interpretation of the Basic Law by the Standing Committee of
NPC in Beijing in June 1999 has been immense. It opens up the
possibility of further interference with CFA rulings. Cases that
involve the interests of the central government in Beijing, like that
involving desecration of the national flag, are most likely to attract
interference from Beijing. It is far from clear what effect this would
have on the CFA in its decisions on such cases. The exact outcome
will not only be dependent on the debate between  ‘judicial
activism’ and  ‘judicial restraint’, but will hinge upon the status
of the CFA itself and whether China’s promise of judicial
independence will be fulfilled.
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